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Maintaining the Permissive Consensus in  
Times of Crises: The Europeanness of Germany’s 
Political Elites, 2007-2014 
Lars Vogel ∗ 
Abstract: »Elitenkonsens in Krisenzeiten. Europäizität der deutschen politi-
schen Eliten 2007-2014«. Germany’s political elites have shared a ‘permissive 
consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008) in support of European integration both 
before and during the global financial and economic crisis, as well as the sub-
sequent Eurocrisis. Their Europeanness encompasses five independent dimen-
sions: general support, trust in EU institutions, ideological aims and cultural 
boundaries of European integration, and the means of integration (intergov-
ernmental or federal conceptions and policy delegation to the European level). 
This permissive consensus has not dissolved in the course of the crises and is 
strongest in terms of general support and trust, while some minor party differ-
ences exist regarding the socioeconomic aims, cultural boundaries and means 
of European integration. This stability is explained by Germany’s dominant eco-
nomic position in Europe and the marked absence of strong Eurosceptic parties 
in domestic politics during the period of investigation. Nevertheless, some ad-
justments with regard to the means of European integration occurred as a re-
sult of the empowerment of Germany’s political elites during the crises. 
Keywords: Political elites, European integration, permissive consensus, Germa-
ny, Eurocrisis, EU, Euroscepticism, Europeanness, Intergovernmentalism. 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter is a case study on German political elites, charting the evolution of 
their attitudes towards European integration (Europeanness) between 2007 and 
2014 and linking them to developments that took place in the long aftermath of 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. Those developments are understood 
as one prolonged crisis comprising multiple stages, evolving from a global 
financial and economic crisis to a sovereign debt and ultimately a political 
crisis of the Eurozone and the entire EU (Eurocrisis). It utilizes a unique longi-
tudinal research design, integrating three surveys conducted among Germany’s 
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national parliamentarians with partially identical questionnaires in 2007, 2009 
(both IntUne) and 2014 (ENEC), thereby spanning various stages of the crisis.1 
Three underlying research questions guide the chapter. Firstly, how is the 
Europeanness of Germany’s political elites structured, given that research 
repeatedly confirms the Europeanness of national elites as a multidimensional 
set of attitudes (see below)? Furthermore, does Germany’s political elite share 
a ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008) concerning European 
integration, i.e. do they unanimously support its status quo and even its deepen-
ing, or are they rather characterized by a ‘constraining dissensus’ (ibid.), that is 
to say, European integration is politicized and MPs from competing parties 
differ significantly in their Europeanness? Finally, to what extent has elites’ 
Europeanness changed in the course of the subsequent stages of the crisis? 
The chapter proceeds from two assumptions. Firstly, that Germany’s politi-
cal elites are ‘consensually unified’ (Higley and Burton 2006) in the sense that 
they almost unanimously support European integration, and secondly, that this 
consensus has not dissolved since 2008. However, given the multidimension-
ality of Europeanness, some adjustments may have occurred due to experiences 
gathered in the course of the crises. These assumptions are based on the partic-
ular impact of the crisis on Germany’s position within the multilevel system of 
the EU. Germany was exposed to the global financial and economic crisis in 
the same way that other Member States of the EU were, but faced neither a 
long-lasting economic recession nor a sovereign debt crisis afterwards. In fact, 
quite the opposite occurred: its rapid economic recovery post-2009 strength-
ened Germany’s economic weight in Europe and made it the most important 
contributor to the rescue packages and institutional rescue mechanisms estab-
lished during the Eurocrisis. Those measures are based on the principle of 
‘bailout-against-austerity’, which extended Germany’s domestic austerity policy 
to the European level. Thus, in contrast to most of the other countries investigated 
in this volume, Germany neither suffered a long-lasting economic recession nor 
was it forced by external actors to implement austerity policies and accompany-
ing neoliberal reforms to prevent national insolvency. Finally, despite some do-
mestic resistance to these policies and to Germany’s financial obligations, no 
relevant Eurosceptic party entered the national parliament in the investigated 
period. Taken together, these developments give no reason to presume a decrease 
in Europeanness.  
However, the rise of the Eurosceptic AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) to 
national prominence had already begun by 2013, and the party gained momen-
tum immediately afterwards, making the politicization of European integration 
more likely. Furthermore, the rescue mechanisms established in the context of 
                                                             
1  In Germany, the ENEC survey was conducted in 2014 at the Friedrich-Schiller-University of 
Jena under the supervision of Prof. Heinrich Best for whose support I am particular indebt-
ed. 
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the Eurocrisis strengthened the intergovernmental elements of European inte-
gration and the stratification of the EU based on economic asymmetries be-
tween Member States. As these developments entail an empowering of Germa-
ny’s political elites, they may favor intergovernmentalism and a strengthened 
role of the Member States more than before the outbreak of the crises. 
Table 1: Parties in the German Bundestag (Seats and Weighted Sample 
Distribution); Percentages 
 2007/2009 2014 
 
Seats 
2007/9 
Sample 
2007 
Sample 
2009 Seats Sample 
Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) 36.8 
36.4 
(29.9) 
36.3 
(32.9) 49.1 
50.0 
(34.4) 
Social Democrats (SPD) 36.2 36.4 (45.5) 
36.3 
(34.2) 30.8 
30.0 
(40.4) 
Liberals (FDP) 9.9 10.4 (9.1) 
10.0 
(13.9) 0.0 0.0 
Post Communists (LINKE) 8.8 9.1 (3.9) 
8.8 
(8.9) 10.1 
10.0 
(20.0) 
Greens (Grüne) 8.3 7.8 (11.7) 
8.8 
(10.1) 10.0 
10.0 
(5.7) 
N 614 77 80 633 70 
1 Figures in brackets refer to the unweighted sample distribution. The bias in 2007 and 2014 towards 
left parties in 2007 and 2014 required weighting for all analyses of the entire political elite. 
 
To investigate these assumptions in the context of a case study, the different 
potential causes of change in MPs’ Europeanness must be considered. The sur-
veys in 2007 and 2009 were conducted in the same legislative period of the Ger-
man Bundestag and, accordingly, the target population did not differ. Thus, 
changes between these two waves are due to MPs or parties changing their stanc-
es and cannot be traced back to electorally-induced shifts in party strength in 
parliament or turn-over of MPs. In contrast, the MPs interviewed in 2014 were 
elected in 2013, implying that changes in Europeanness between 2009 and 2014 
may be due to either changed stances or altered party composition of the parlia-
ment. In this respect, the dropout of the Liberals, the shrinking of the Social 
Democrats and the related strengthening of the Christian Democrats from 36.8 
percent to 49.1 percent of seats mark the three pivotal re-arrangements (Table 1). 
Attitudinal change among MPs may be caused by altered party composition of 
the national parliament or by MPs or parties shifting their party stances. In order 
to disentangle these two sources of change, the analysis is conducted for the 
entire elite, and separately for the main parties Christian Democrats (CDU)2 and 
                                                             
2  By “Christian Democrats” we mean the joint parliamentary party group of the CDU (Chris-
tian Democratic Union) and its “sister party”, the CSU (Christian Social Union). Both parties 
do not compete with each other but have divided their regions of interest. The CSU is lim-
ited to Bavaria and the CDU to the rest of Germany. 
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Social Democrats (SPD). A separate analysis of the remaining small parties is 
impeded by the number of cases available for study. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section two outlines the European and 
domestic political context of German politics in the subsequent stages of the 
crisis, while section three identifies five dimensions structuring Germany’s 
elites Europeanness through a Principal-Component-Analysis (PCA). Section 
four develops the theoretical expectations concerning the evolution of Euro-
peanness in the course of the crises and describes its longitudinal development 
between 2007 and 2014, separated for the five identified dimensions. The last 
section summarizes our results and provides some conclusions. 
2.  European Integration and German Politics in Times of 
Crisis 
European integration has been supported by German national elites consensual-
ly and almost unconditionally since the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community in 1951, at least until Germany’s re-unification. Pro-
Europeanism and European integration as part of the Westbindung helped to 
regain room of maneuver for Germany’s national elites and ultimately the 
sovereignty of the nation state. They further flanked Germany’s politics as a 
‘tamed power’ (Katzenstein 1997) constrained by its integration into a suprana-
tional multi-level system, and supported the recovery of political trust despite the 
relative (economic and demographic) German dominance in Europe. Following 
re-unification and the end of the Cold War, however, national interests have 
gradually re-emerged as a guiding principle of German politics, which may have 
transformed the unconditional pro-Europeanism to a conditional one. Some ob-
servers perceive Germany’s politics in the Eurozone crisis as driven by ‘national 
interests and assertiveness’ (Bulmer 2014, 1249), while the deepening of Europe-
an integration and solidarity are reduced to rhetorical ornaments. 
The events following the burst of the real estate bubbles in the US and other 
states in autumn 2008 began as a crisis of the financial and banking system, but 
because the credibility of banking houses was severely damaged, serious credit 
crunches soon occurred, resulting in economic contraction and rising levels of 
unemployment worldwide comparable only to the economic recession wit-
nessed during the Great Depression in the 1930s. National governments re-
sponded with deficit spending and expanding public debt in order to bail out 
the banking houses allegedly ‘too big to fail’ and to substitute for investments 
not anymore provided by market-based credit flow. The addition of these 
bailouts and investments to the already existing levels of sovereign debt led to 
consequences that prompted the crisis to evolve further into a sovereign debt 
crisis in some EU Member States (see introduction to this HSR Special Issue, 
Vogel and Teruel 2016). Germany’s debt rose from 63.6 percent of GDP in the 
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pre-crisis year 2007 to 81.8 in 2010 and has decreased since then. The GDP 
growth rate, which was negative in 2009 (-5.6), turned positive by 2010. In 
contrast, Greek sovereign debt totaled 103.5 of GDP already in 2007, while 
climbing to 146.2 percent in 2010. At the same time, however, the economy 
failed to recover from the 2009 decline; growth rates have remained negative 
since 2009. Thus, while Germany’s economy underwent a heavy but short-
lasting shock, Greece’s economy has suffered from severe economic recession, 
while its state budget has faced skyrocketing levels of indebtedness since the 
outbreak of the crisis. 
The interest rates of Greek state bonds increased rapidly by the end of 2009, 
when financial market actors lost confidence that Greece would continue to 
perform its debt service and major rating agencies downgraded Greece’s credit 
rating. Initially, the German government considered the sovereign debt crises in 
Greece and other states, primarily in Southern Europe, as country-specific 
affairs caused by their internal structural problems (Bulmer 2014, 1253). This 
policy and rhetoric was hardly suited to calm the markets for state bonds, as it 
cast doubt on the notion that the economically prosperous states would eventu-
ally bail out Greece. The danger of a Greek default increased only a few weeks 
later, in Spring 2010 after the 2009 German federal elections – fueled by mas-
sive speculation and the Greek government’s official request for financial aid. 
Amongst others, the German government feared that a Greek default would 
lead to the sovereign debt crisis spreading to other, especially southern, Euro-
zone countries and a return of the banking crisis in northern countries, given 
that these banks were Greece’s main creditors (Hall 2012, 364). Thus, the EU 
agreed on the first Greek bailout in 2010, funded by the EU, the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the IMF. This rescue package was followed by 
bailouts of Ireland and Portugal and culminated in the establishment of the 
temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and later the perma-
nent European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
These measures were designed to bailout EU Member States encountering 
difficulties selling their bonds on the private financial market and thus at risk of 
default, and were based on loans provided by the financially prosperous Mem-
ber States, the EU and the IWF. The availment of these loans is conditional and 
requires that debtor states enact austerity policies to reach and/or maintain 
fiscal stability. These conditions have been firmly fixed in the European Fiscal 
Compact (EFC) and comprise amongst others a balanced state budget, a debt 
ceiling installed in the constitution of each country (or comparable level), and 
automatic sanctions should members fail to meet the conditions of the EFC. 
The EFC is a multilateral treaty signed by most EU Member States except the 
Czech Republic and Great Britain, thereby circumventing the decisional mech-
anisms and institutions of the EU. 
Germany has played a major role in shaping this ‘bailout-against-austerity’ 
policy, which was determined by the widespread belief among Germany’s 
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political elite that consolidating state budgets is key to economic growth and 
fiscal stability. Germany’s economic strength made it the major contributor to 
the multiple rescue packages, and thus aided in enforcing its austerity policy at 
the EU level. This austerity policy was indeed challenged, but never aban-
doned, although the governments of various EU Member States tried to resist it 
and proposed alternative strategies, particularly given that this policy caused 
severe pressure in the form of political upheavals and the rise of populist parties, 
and despite the fact that some governments were even forced to resign in the 
course of this crisis (such as Greece, Spain and Italy). Germany’s dominant role 
is last but not least reflected in the decision-making procedure of the ESM, in 
which vote share depends on a country’s contribution to the ESM capital stock, 
giving Germany (and France) the potential to veto virtually every decision. 
Despite the elevation of Germany’s economic and fiscal principles to the 
predominant policy in the EU, resistance by domestic political actors in Ger-
many has been present since the outbreak of the Eurocrisis. The 2009 national 
elections, held immediately before the Greek bailout when disturbances caused 
by the financial crisis had begun to recede in Germany, resulted in the termina-
tion of the governing grand coalition between Christian and Social Democrats. 
Henceforth until 2013, the government was based on a coalition between the 
Christian Democrats and the FDP (Liberals). The Social Democrats, who con-
stituted the biggest opposition party over this period, were principally in sup-
port of the newly-elected government’s bailout-against-austerity policy. Never-
theless, they called for economic investments as a supplement to austerity in 
order to support the devastated economies of the crisis-ridden countries, and 
demanded that private creditors participate in debt relief. In contrast, the Liber-
als, as junior partner in the governing coalition, had based their 2009 electoral 
campaign on clear positions in favor of tax cuts, and were thus reluctant to 
spend money on financially unconsolidated countries. Moreover, they regarded 
a Greek exit from the Eurozone as a potential solution to prevent further dam-
age to the currency union. A party congress was held in 2010 to decide the 
Liberals’ stance on the first Greek rescue package, wherein its supporters won, 
albeit only by a small margin. Subsequently, the number of defecting MPs in 
the ranks of the government continued to swell with every parliamentary vote 
on rescue packages for individual countries or the installation of the permanent 
rescue mechanisms (Zimmermann 2014, 328).  
Despite this resistance, ongoing parliamentary support was secured by the 
Social Democrats. Consequently, the bailout of suffering Member States did 
not constitute a major issue in the electoral campaign of 2013 (Zimmermann 
2014), although the election nevertheless resulted in the end of the governing 
coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals (due to the complete dropout of 
the Liberals from parliament ) and was followed by a new grand coalition. 
Unlike many other European countries, the pressure from Eurosceptic parties in 
the election was marginal. The AfD, a party constituted only several months 
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prior to the 2013 elections and fundamentally opposed to the Euro and deep-
ened European integration, failed to enter parliament. Nevertheless, it missed 
the threshold only narrowly and was successful in all subsequent state elec-
tions, as well as in elections to the European Parliament. 
3.  Patterns of Europeanness among the German Political 
Elite, 2007-2014 
What drove the policy of Germany’s political elites during the crises outlined 
above, have these crises altered their perceptions, evaluations and dispositions 
towards European integration, and if so, how? To answer these questions, a 
simple distinction between Europhiles and Eurosceptics is inappropriate, as it 
has already been demonstrated that Europeanness (Best, Lengyel and 
Verzichelli 2012a) encompasses multiple dimensions of attitudes towards Eu-
ropean integration and elites’ stances vary with respect to the dimension of 
Europeanness they are asked to evaluate. Accordingly, national elites are only 
rarely consistent Europhiles or Eurosceptics in all dimensions, resulting in 
party- and country-specific patterns of Europeanness (Cotta and Russo 2012). 
Several dimensions of Europeanness have been identified. Best, Lengyel 
and Verzichelli (2012b) distinguish between an emotive, cognitive and cona-
tive-projective dimension. The first dimension is based on an emotional at-
tachment to Europe and self-identification as a European; the cognitive dimen-
sion refers to the evaluation of the state of European integration between the 
two poles of further deepening and rolling back integration, while the conative-
projective dimension comprises the approval or rejection of policy delegation 
to the EU. The concept proposed by Cotta and Isernia (2009) distinguishes 
between identity, representation and scope of governance, which is obviously 
closely connected to the aforementioned triad. However, the facet of represen-
tation primarily considers the relation between the nation state and the suprana-
tional layer, oscillating between intergovernmentalism and federalism. Cotta 
and Russo (2012) present empirical evidence for national elites in eighteen 
European countries, elucidating an even more differentiated structure. General 
support for supranational integration is fused with attachment (the emotive 
component) and with approval of federalism, i.e. strengthening the Commis-
sion and the European Parliament (the representation component). The alloca-
tion of policy competencies at the different levels (scope of governance) forms 
a distinct dimension, but is further differentiated by policy fields. Elites draw a 
clear delineation between the delegation of policies traditionally linked to the 
nation state (taxation, social security) and policies that transcend national bor-
ders (such as immigration, crime and environment). This distinction between 
national and transnational policies partially overlaps with the differentiation 
between redistributive and non-distributive policies (Best 2012, 236). Finally, 
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the evaluation of how one’s own country is represented in EU politics and the 
asymmetric influence of its Member States constitute a fifth dimension. 
To investigate the dimensions of Europeanness among German political 
elites, principal-component analysis (PCA) with non-orthogonal rotation is 
applied to a set of eighteen survey items suited to capture a wide variety of the 
abovementioned concepts (Table 2). The data for the PCA is the totality of all 
German MPs interviewed in all three survey waves (N=224). Some items ini-
tially included in the PCA were later removed, as they failed the even generous 
requirement of a KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion) exceeding .5. The an-
swers to these items are accordingly independent of the remaining dimensions 
of Europeanness. Among them are respondents’ opinions as to whether or not 
their own country has benefitted from EU membership,3 the question as to 
whether or not economic differences between Member States are a threat to the 
EU overall,4 whether health care policy is best allocated at the regional, nation-
al or European level,5 and lastly, the perception that some countries have too 
much weight inside the EU.6  
Five factors that display an Eigenvalue above one in advance to their rota-
tion were initially extracted and subsequently rotated. The first factor is defined 
by the perception of two threats for European integration: Turkish accession to 
the EU and immigration from countries outside the EU,7 as well as whether the 
primary policy aim of the EU is to increase the competitiveness of the Europe-
an economy or the social security of its citizens.8 This factor constitutes the 
ideological (left-right) dimension in terms of policy aims and cultural bounda-
ries of European integration with elites on the right opposing Turkish accession 
and reluctant to accept immigration from outside the EU, but favoring competi-
tiveness over social security. It is important to note that some other issues have 
                                                             
3  “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Germany has on the whole 
benefitted from being a member of the European Union, or not?” 1 Has benefitted, 2 has 
not benefitted, DK, Ref. 
4  “Do you think that […] is a threat or not a threat to the EU?” Here: Economic differences 
among Member States; 1 A big threat, 2 Quite a big threat, 3 Not a big threat at all, 4 Not a 
threat at all, DK, Ref. 
5  “How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal with each of the following policy 
areas? Do you think that [Health care] should be mainly dealt with at the regional level, na-
tional level, or European Union level?” 1 exclusively Regional/National, 2 including EU (vol-
unteered), 3 mainly EU, DK, ref. 
6  “The interests of some Member States carry too much weight at the EU level”. 1 Strongly 
agree, 2 Agree somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 Strongly disagree, Neither, DK, Ref. 
7  “Do you think that […] is a threat or not a threat for the EU?” Here: Enlargement of the EU 
to include Turkey / Immigration from Non-EU countries; 1 A big threat, 2 Quite a big threat, 
3 Not a big threat at all, 4 Not a threat at all, DK, Ref. 
8  “I’m going to read you two statements. Please tell me which of them comes closest to your 
view.” (rotated) 1 The main aim of the EU should be to make the European economy more 
competitive on the world market. 3 The main aim of the EU should be to provide better so-
cial security for all its citizens. 2 Both (volunteered). 
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smaller but noteworthy loadings on this dimension. Strongest among them is 
the general evaluation of the status of European integration.9 Therefore, the 
socioeconomic and cultural conceptions of European integration are fused on 
the left-right-dimension, while the general evaluation of European integration 
constitutes a distinct but partially overlapping dimension of Europeanness, i.e. 
MPs from the right are less enthusiastic supporters of deepened unification. 
This pattern further contributes to the multifaceted dimensionality of the three 
fundamental conflicts – socioeconomic, cultural, and supranational integration 
– that structure party competition throughout Europe in a multitude of combi-
nations (Marks, Steenbergen and Hooghe 2012; Proksch and Lo 2012; Real-
Dato, Göncz and Lengyel 2012, 77; Prosser 2016). 
Table 2: Principal Component Analysis of Political Elites’ Attitudes towards 
European Integration (KMO Criteria and Component Loadings)10 
  Components 
 KMO I II III IV V 
Threats: Immigration from outside EU .691 .797 .146 -.049 -.100 .138 
Threats: Enlargement to Turkey  .745 .764 -.055 .167 .109 .302 
Main aim of EU: Competition - Social Security .805 .693 -.150 .233 .018 .050 
Trust in European Commission .571 .091 .867 .137 -.038 -.052 
Trust in Council of Ministers .622 -.268 .786 -.163 -.004 .016 
Trust in European Parliament .774 .171 .569 .157 -.148 .332 
Member States should remain central actors .819 .326 .033 .635 -.063 .110 
The own country is not represented in EU .780 .316 .023 .628 .187 -.183 
National vs. EU-Army .762 -.009 -.040 .580 .084 .095 
Commission should become true government .772 .044 -.278 -.557 -.045 -.369 
EU should make policy: Fighting crime .593 -.059 -.020 -.020 .743 -.087 
EU should make policy: Environment .643 .044 .009 .152 .705 -.069 
EU should make policy: Unemployment .686 .080 -.145 -.001 .630 .328 
EU should make policy: Immigration .711 -.115 -.006 .393 .462 .306 
Powers of EP should be strengthened .759 -.121 .310 -.341 .160 -.606 
Unification should be strengthened .854 .337 .094 .087 -.013 .565 
Attachment to Europe .828 -.136 -.199 .009 -.228 -.537 
Eigenvalue  2.19 1.99 1.91 1.83 1.61 
 
Trust in EU institutions constitutes the second factor.11 Given that the European 
Commission (EC) comprises a federal element and the European Council of 
                                                             
9  “Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it already has gone too 
far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, 
'0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it "should be strengthened". 
What number on this scale best describes your position?”. 
10  Overall KMO: .726, Rotation: Varimax, Pairwise correlations. 
11  “Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the following EU 
institutions to usually take the right decisions. 0 means that you do not trust an institution 
at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: European Parliament, European Commission, 
European Council of Ministers.” 
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Ministers an intergovernmental body, it is remarkable that trust in these institu-
tions is much closer linked to each another than to trust in the European Par-
liament (EP). 
The third factor is defined by the evaluation of the role of the Member 
States within the EU,12 whether one’s own country is adequately represented in 
EU policies,13 stances on the establishment of a European army,14 and finally 
whether or not development of the Commission towards a true executive body 
is supported.15 This dimension of Europeanness is therefore suited to capture 
the distinction between intergovernmental and federal conceptions of Europe, 
with the former envisioning Member States (as opposed to the supranational 
commission) as central actors, exhibiting a preference for maintaining defense 
as task of the respective Member States, and sharing the conviction that the 
national interests of their own country are insufficiently represented in the EU. 
Nevertheless, since the two anchor items concerning the role of nation states 
display noteworthy loadings as well on component I, German MPs consider the 
cultural and economic aims of unification to be not entirely independent from 
the means thereof. 
For German MPs, the delegation of policies to the European level consti-
tutes a factor independent of the general evaluation of European integration and 
its core institutions.16 This is similar to earlier results, according to which MPs 
take an instrumental view on the delegation of policies (Real-Dato, Göncz and 
Lengyel 2012), depending on which level (regional, national, EU) they can be 
conducted most efficiently at (Cotta and Russo 2012, 39) or at which their 
(redistributive) leverage for electoral gains in the national arena is maximized 
(Best 2012, 236). But the evaluation of policy delegation is even more nu-
anced. This dimension seems to be dominated by valence policy issues about 
whose aims – reducing unemployment and crime, protecting the environment – 
German MPs expect agreement between the Member States, but not necessarily 
about which means are most appropriate to reach them. Judging from the sec-
                                                             
12  “The Member States ought to remain the central actors of the European Union”. 1 Strongly 
agree, 2 Agree somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 Strongly disagree, Neither, DK, Ref. 
13  “Those who make decisions at the European Union level do not take the interests of Germa-
ny into sufficient account.” 1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 
Strongly disagree, Neither, DK, Ref. 
14  “Some say that we should have a single European Union Army. Others say every country should 
keep its own national army. What is your opinion?” 1 A national army , 2 Both a national and a 
European Union army , 3 A European Union army, Neither (volunteered), DK, Ref. 
15  “The European Commission ought to become the true government of the European Union.” 1 
Strongly agree, 2 Agree somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 Strongly disagree, Neither, DK, Ref. 
16  “How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal with each of the following policy 
areas? Do you think that [Unemployment, Immigration, Environmental policy, Fighting 
against crime, Health care] should be dealt with primarily at the regional level, national lev-
el, or European Union level?” 1 exclusively Regional/National, 2 including EU (volunteered), 
3 mainly EU, DK, ref. 
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ondary loadings on other components, the issue of immigration is, in contrast, 
torn between the insight that it may be most efficiently handled at the EU level 
and the fear that this delegation will harm the national interest. Furthermore, 
immigration and (to a smaller degree) unemployment are determined by the 
fifth and final factor, which can be described as general support for European 
integration combining support for the strengthening of the European Parlia-
ment (EP),17 the general evaluation of the state of European integration and 
emotional identification with Europe.18 General support for deepened integra-
tion among German elites is primarily emotionally grounded, largely independ-
ent of the aims, means and particular policies combined with further integra-
tion, but linked to democratization of the EU by parliamentarization. As 
indicated by its secondary loadings, the prospect for further democratization 
via a strengthened EP is further supported by trust in this institution and by a 
federal conception of the EU. 
4.  Development of German Elites’ Europeanness,  
2007-2014: Expectations 
Given these patterns, what sort of development of German elites’ Europeanness 
can we theoretically expect in the course of the subsequent crises since 2008? 
Against the backdrop of the economic origin of the crises and indications that 
economic considerations are growing in importance (Hobolt and Wratil 2015), 
a utilitarian approach seems to be most appropriate, stating that the support for 
European integration is conditional in terms of economic outcomes, either 
individually or with view to perceived collective outcomes for one’s own coun-
try (Gabel 1998; Aspinwall 2007). Utilitarian considerations are especially 
important if salient economic outcomes are linked to European integration and 
if the choice for deepened integration appears as relevant to the outcome 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005, 422). This is definitely true for national elites forced 
to choose between national, federal and intergovernmental responses to the 
challenges posed by the crises. Since Germany has neither suffered prolonged 
economic difficulties (in contrast to most of the countries investigated in this 
HSR Special Issue), nor was it pushed to externally-imposed austerity 
measures, stability of Europeanness in all its dimensions seems likely. Moreo-
ver, the rescue measures, initially created for tottering banking houses and 
subsequently for European Member States, were successfully coordinated 
                                                             
17  “The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened.” 1 Strongly agree, 2 
Agree somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 Strongly disagree, Neither, DK, Ref. 
18  “People feel different degrees of attachment to their region, to their country and to Europe. 
What about you?” 1 Are you very attached, 2 somewhat attached, 3 not very attached or 4 
not at all attached to Europe, DK, Ref. 
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between most Member States, which may have increased MPs’ perception that 
European integration is beneficial for their own country, thus subsequently 
bolstering pro-European positions among them. 
The utilitarian-instrumental approach could be expanded further. Intergov-
ernmental views of European integration presume integration as a strategy of 
national elites to maintain or to enlarge its room of maneuver vis-à-vis the 
challenges and risks of globalization (Moravcsik 1999; Haller 2008). Its con-
duct and the means chosen for it are dependent on the trade-off between the 
empowerment and political support national elites gain from integration and the 
risk that they will be pushed to enforce unpopular policies imposed by the EU, 
for which they are then likely to be punished by their national voters (Best 
2012, 236). Germany was able to transfer its national austerity policy onto 
almost all EU Member States, requiring and entailing a tremendous empower-
ment of German national elites. The politics that led to the EFSF, ESM and 
finally the FSC were dominated by intergovernmental regimes circumventing 
EU institutions and decision-making processes. We therefore assume a shift in 
the intergovernmental-federal dimension and its encompassing items to the 
pronunciation of the impact of the nation states. One caveat against this, how-
ever, is that MPs may be less empowered than their governments by the shift to 
intergovernmental regimes, which may make them less enthusiastic about it. 
At the same time, punishment by voters in national elections became more 
likely, because the Eurocrisis contributed to the politicization of European 
integration in Germany. While the grand coalition exhibited broad agreement 
around 2008/9 to save national banking houses and find EU-wide solutions to 
(re-)regulate the financial- and banking sector, the agreement on rescue mecha-
nisms for EU Member States has constituted a more controversial issue within 
German domestic politics. In particular, the various Greek bailouts have fueled 
anti-European sentiments in the public debate. Germany already undertook 
neo-liberal reforms beginning around 2003, which the public nowadays views 
as burdens that were nevertheless necessary for the subsequent positive eco-
nomic developments in Germany. This positive evaluation and the perception 
of a lack of comparable will among the Greeks to implement painful but effi-
cient reforms made the German public reluctant to support the bailouts. Despite 
upheavals in public opinion and among parts of the governing coalition, the 
populist AfD was nevertheless the only party that transformed these sentiments 
into anti-European stances. Thus, politicization occurs primarily as conflict 
between the established parties, which share a pro-European consensus, and the 
emerging AfD, comparable to the political situation in other countries 
(Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016). Nevertheless, the electoral heyday of the 
AfD did not begin before 2015 (see above), around the time that the inflow of 
refugees and migrants rapidly increased, indicating that the AfD was not a 
severe threat to the established parties until then. Therefore, major changes in 
the Europeanness of German MPs between 2007 and 2014 are not expected. 
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5.  Development of German Elites’ Europeanness, 
2007-2014: Empirical Results 
The various items surveying general support for European integration (compo-
nent V) show no significant changes throughout the course of the crises. Large 
majorities of Germany’s national elites favor strengthening the EP, deepening 
European integration, and feel, on average, attached or very attached to Europe. 
One important source for this general pro-European stance is their consensually 
shared and stable conviction that Germany has benefitted from European inte-
gration. Given this consensus, it becomes clear that this conviction is separate 
from the remaining dimensions of Europeanness. 
Figure 1: General Support for European Integration 2007-2014 (Means and 
Percentages)1 
— All   – – –  CDU    SPD 
Strengthening of EP European Integration Attachment to Europe   Germany has benefitted2 
     1 agree – 4 disagree             0 already too far– 10 further  1 very attached – 4 not at all      “has benefitted” (%) 
All n.s.  CDU n.s.  SPD n.s.          All n.s.  CDU n.s.  SPD n.s.    All n.s.  CDU n.s.  SPD n.s.  All n.s. CDU n.s.  SPD n.s.
 
1 Figures for means and percentages refer to “All”. P-values for differences between years 
reported in the last row are based on F-tests for means and Chi2-tests for percentages. 
+p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
2  Not included on PCA due to lack of variance. 
 
Despite this consensual tendency, nuanced differences between parties can be 
observed: The general support among the Christian Democrats is slightly less 
enthusiastic, whereas the Social Democrats display a more supportive stance in 
all items. This support has not increased since 2007, as the differences between 
waves are not significant. These results confirm the assumption that the crisis 
had no negative impact on the general support of European integration among 
Germany’s political elite. However, neither multilateral coordination in the 
global financial crisis nor the experiences of the Eurocrisis have increased the 
level of general support either. 
In contrast to aforementioned general support, the ideological aims of Euro-
pean integration are more controversial, and are determined by the underlying 
left-right party competition. Political elites in Germany are rather divided on 
the issue of whether social security or competitiveness should prevail, with 
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Christian Democrats clearly opting for the former and Social Democrats for the 
latter (Figure 2). Nevertheless, there seems to be a consistent tendency among 
Christian Democrats to acknowledge social security as an important aim. This 
trend is accompanied by an increased emphasis of this aim among Social Dem-
ocrats at the peak of the financial and economic crisis in 2009, although both 
developments fail to attain statistical significance. 
Figure 2: Competition or Social Security as Main Aim 2007-2014 (Percentages)1 
     n.s.   n.s.   n.s.  
1 P-values based on Chi2-tests.  
 
The perception of the boundaries of European integration resembles this left-
right-distinction (Figure 3). Christian Democrats perceive immigration from 
outside the EU and the potential accession of Turkey as much more pressing 
threats than Social Democrats. While the perception of Turkey remains stable 
during the crisis, the stance towards non-EU immigration is more volatile: its 
salience drops significantly in 2009 but rises again in 2014. The threats in 
question are externally induced, while the following two threats are constituted 
by the internal configuration of the EU. Both could not be included in the 
PCA19 and exhibit a distinct development i.e. a continuous increase in salience 
of the two threats under consideration. German MPs regard internal threats as 
more severe than external threats and party differences are dramatically less 
pronounced. The perception of problematic economic asymmetries among 
Member States has increased during the course of the crises, while the assess-
ment of superiority of national interests as threats remains quite stable. Thus, 
the crises have elevated the idea that economic asymmetry is a destabilizing 
element of European integration. 
                                                             
19  The question of the priority of national interests was not asked in 2007 and the question 
about economic differences as threat had a KMO below .5.  
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Figure 3: Threats for European Integration 2007-2014 (Means)1 
—— All   – – –  CDU    SPD 
Immigration from  
Non-EU 
Enlargement to  
Turkey 
       Priority of national 
interests20 
Economic  
differences21 
1 big threat – 4 no threat 
 
 All (***) CDU (+) SPD (***)   All n.s. CDU n.s. SPD n.s.   All n.s. CDU n.s. SPD n.s.    All (*) CDU n.s. SPD (*) 
1  Figures for means refer to “All”. P-values for differences between years reported in the last 
row are based on F-tests. +p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
Figure 4: Trust in EU institutions (Means)1 
—— All   – – –  CDU    SPD 
            Commission                  EP          Council of Ministers 
0 no trust – 10 complete trust 
          All n.s.  CDU n.s.  SPD (*)             All n.s.  CDU n.s.  SPD n.s.     All n.s.  CDU n.s.  SPD n.s. 
         
1 Figures for means refer to “All”. P-values for differences between years reported in the last 
row are based on F-tests. +p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
Trust in EU institutions is quite solid among German MPs, whereby the EP 
enjoys the highest trust (Figure 4). Trust remains stable during the course of the 
crises and party differences are negligible. Only the Social Democrats lost trust 
in the Commission at the peak of the global financial and economic crisis in 
2009, but by 2014 they were back to pre-crisis levels. 
                                                             
20  Question wording in FN 6. Here: The propensity of some Member States to put their nation-
al interest first. 
21  Question wording in FN 6. Here: Economic differences among Member States. 
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Intergovernmental and federal convictions concerning European integration 
seem to be more susceptible to change during the course of the crises. While a 
clear tendency to retain the Member States as central actors could be observed 
in 2007, the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 has slightly weakened this convic-
tion, although the intergovernmental approach nevertheless prevails, especially 
among the Christian Democrats (Figure 5). The perception that Germany’s 
interests are not adequately represented in EU decision-making was never 
widespread and has even decreased among Social Democrats since the finan-
cial crisis evolved into the Eurozone crisis between 2009 and 2014. Thus, 
Germany’s political elite perceives a relative empowerment of their country in 
the course of the Eurocrisis. The minor increase in support for federal ap-
proaches could be observed as well in the stable or – among the Christian 
Democrats – gradually increased support to furnish the Commission with gov-
ernmental competencies. Despite this tendency, Germany’s political elites 
evaluate the path to federalism via an enhancement of the Commission as a 
secondary option compared to the path via a strengthened EP (see above). 
Figure 5: Intergovernmental and federal concepts of the EU, 2007-2014 
(Means)1 
—— All   – – –  CDU    SPD 
 
Member states  
central 
Germany not  
represented 
Commission as 
government 
Asymmetries 
too large2 
    
1 agree – 4 disagree 
 
All (*) CDU (+) SPD (***)         All (**)  CDU n.s.  SPD (***)     All n.s.  CDU (+)  SPD n.s.    All (**)  CDU n.s.  SPD (*)
1 Figures for means refer to “All”. P-values for differences between years reported in the last 
row are based on F-tests. +p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
2 Not included in PCA due to KMO below .5. 
 
Party differences structure all three items, with the Christian Democrats dis-
playing a stronger intergovernmental view that emphasizes the national inter-
est. In contrast, there is agreement between parties that the asymmetries be-
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between Member States and their relative importance, whereas the two other 
questions consider the relation between Member States and supranational insti-
tutions. The latter convictions display a minor shift towards strengthening the 
supranational elements exclusively during the period of financial and economic 
crisis in 2009. The former convictions only change when the state budget crisis 
evolved to the Eurozone crisis. This may indicate that the initial period of the 
crisis was perceived by Germany’s political elite as being characterized by 
similar challenges for all Member States, which alleviated common responses, 
while the deficit spending strategy to counter the global financial and economic 
crisis amplified national differences that subsequently began to dominate and to 
impede collective political responses within the EU. 
Figure 6: National vs. European Army 2007-2014 (Percentages)1 
         * n.s.         n.s.  
1 P-values for differences between years reported are based on Chi2-tests. +p<.1; *p<.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
Beyond general evaluations, the balance between Member States and the su-
pranational level becomes especially visible in the preferred level of policy-
making. A common European army substituting national armies is the litmus 
test for federal convictions, for the reason that defense policy is at the core of 
national sovereignty. Its importance is confirmed by the attribution of this 
question to the general evaluation of intergovernmentalism and federalism and 
by its demarcations to remaining policy issues evaluated on divergent princi-
ples. In 2007, an absolute majority of MPs preferred a European army to a 
national one, and although this majority decreased at the outset of the crises, it 
had almost climbed back to pre-crisis level in 2014 (Figure 6). However, there 
is a tendency among the Christian Democrats to remain at a lower level of 
support since 2009. The backdrop for a federal army is not accompanied by 
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renewed requests for national armies but for a merging of supranational and 
national military structures.22 Thus, the development of this core policy area 
during the years of crises reveals growing approval for a mix of supranational 
and national elements, steadily decreasing preference for national solutions and 
temporarily weakened support for strict federalism in 2009, which is yet again 
the most preferred option in 2014. 
Figure 7: Allocation of policy-making 2007-2014 (Percentages)1 
Unemployment 
 
Immigration 
 
  
                                                             
22  The “both“ category was not volunteered in all three waves. 
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Environment 
 
Fighting Crime 
 
Health Care2 
 
1 P-values for differences between years reported are based on Chi2-tests. +p<.1; *p<.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.001. 
2  Not included in PCA due to lack of variance. 
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Other policy areas are determined by alternative considerations and accord-
ingly constitute a separate factor. Furthermore, the patterns of policy delegation 
to the regional/national and EU level are both distinct from the military issue 
and internally heterogeneous (Figure 7). Germany’s political elite prefers to 
retain responsibility for the health care system and for the reduction of unem-
ployment completely at the national level. On the contrary, there are huge 
majorities for the Europeanization of immigration and environmental policies 
at most of the measured time points. The fight against crime is somehow locat-
ed in between, since the preferences of German MPs are divided between opt-
ing for the national or the European level. The remarkable exception is 2009, 
when many MPs changed their views and regarded crime issues primarily as a 
national task. Labor market and health care are the two out of all investigated 
policy areas most predestined for redistributive policies. Thus, the results sup-
port the assumption that elites reject policy delegation to the EU if it lowers 
their distributive potentials. 
In comparison to the differences between policy areas, the party differences 
are of secondary importance. Virtually none exist with regard to health care 
policy. But while the preferences concerning the appropriate level to fight 
crime in 2007 and 2014 are collectively divided among the Christian Demo-
crats, the majority of Social Democrats changed from national to European 
solutions during the course of the crises. Concerning immigration and envi-
ronment, the dominance of Europeanization is slightly more pronounced 
among the Social Democrats. The most remarkable party difference appeared 
in 2014, when the Social Democrats were collectively undecided about the 
level at which to deal with unemployment while the Christian Democrats opted 
by an overwhelming majority for the national or regional level.  
With the exception of health care, the remaining policy delegation issues are 
among the most volatile of all dimensions of Europeanness, measured by the 
amount of change and its significance.23 The dominant pattern is the temporary 
increase in support for (re-)allocation of immigration, environmental and crim-
inal policies to the national level in 2009, which nevertheless vanishes after-
wards, and the growing desire for Europeanization of labor market policies 
among the Social Democrats in 2014. Since this peak of national policy solu-
tions occurred in both parties absent national elections between 2007 and 2009, 
it cannot be explained by electoral turnover, but rather by MPs’ reconsidera-
tions concerning the proper level of policy allocation. This change indicates 
that Germany’s political elites base their judgments concerning the delegation 
of policies on rather flexible calculations, whose result was negative for Euro-
peanization at the time of the financial and economic crisis but reverted to 
positive the longer the crises endured and the more they developed into the 
                                                             
23  This is supported by a comparison of Cramer’s V for all investigated items crossed by years, 
whereby the items of the policy delegation dimension score most frequently highest. 
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Eurozone crisis. This result contrasts to the development of supranational and 
federal convictions, which increased between 2007 and 2009 in the course of 
the global financial crisis, and accordingly confirms the distinctiveness of these 
two dimensions (see above). 
6.  Conclusion 
This contribution explored the structure and development of the Europeanness 
of Germany’s political elite during the course of the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis and the subsequent Eurocrisis. The structure of attitudes towards 
Europe and European integration among Germany’s political elites is – similar 
to other European countries – multidimensional. Although some interrelation 
exists between the five dimensions of general support, trust in EU institutions, 
left-right ideological aims, and the two means of intergovernmental-federal 
conceptions and policy delegation, they constitute distinct evaluation criteria 
and refer to different objects and facets of European integration. 
A dichotomy between Europhiles and Eurosceptics is thus inappropriate to 
characterize elites’ Europeanness in Germany. Nevertheless, they could be 
described as Europhiles in general terms, as they are consensually unified 
(Higley and Burton 2006) with regard to almost all dimensions of European-
ness, and this consensus can be described as generally permissive, i.e. favoring 
European integration. General support is emotionally grounded and backed by 
the unanimously shared conviction that Germany has benefitted from European 
integration. Although general support is only loosely linked to rather concrete 
conceptions of Europe, it is closely connected to the distinctive request for 
further democratization via the parliamentarization of the EU. At first glance, 
this may come as no surprise given the inclination of parliamentarians towards 
representative institutions, but it is surprising given that strengthening the EP 
does not necessarily imply enhancements for the national parliaments – indeed, 
the opposite is more likely. Although the Christian Democrats are slightly less 
enthusiastic supporters than the Social Democrats, the more important party 
differences appear below the level of general support, namely with regard to 
the aims, boundaries and means of European integration. The position of their 
respective parties on the left-right dimension structures the aims and bounda-
ries MPs assign to European integration. Concerning the means of European 
politics, Social Democrats favor a federal and supranational institutional 
framework slightly more, while Christian Democrats are more reluctant, pursu-
ing intergovernmental and thus national-centered approaches. The same pattern 
can be observed with regard to decisions concerning the allocation of particular 
policy issues at the national or EU level. However, party affiliation is less 
decisive in these decisions than the respective policy area an issue belongs too. 
Especially with view to policies exhibiting strong redistributive potentials, MPs 
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are reluctant to delegate them to the EU level. Overall, these results reconfirm 
that consensus is prevalent among German MPs, while party differences are of 
secondary importance. 
The consensus among Germany’s political elites described in this chapter 
has not dissolved in the course of either the global financial and economic 
crisis nor during the Eurocrisis, which means that European integration was not 
further politicized at the level of domestic elites. Overall, general support and 
trust in core EU institutions remained stable, along with the reported ideologi-
cal aims and boundaries assigned to the integration process. Less stability was 
observed concerning the remaining dimensions encompassing the means of 
European integration. At the level of basic institutional conceptions, federalism 
gained slightly more support during the global financial and economic crisis, 
but remains less prominent than intergovernmental approaches. Support for 
federalism has not increased further during the Eurocrisis, but since this crisis 
emerged, Germany’s political elites perceive growing heterogeneity between 
Member States and the growing tendency towards assertion of national inter-
ests increasingly as threats to the integration process. This perception has in-
creased particularly among Social Democrats, perhaps fueled by their likewise 
heightened perception of growing German influence within the EU. Support for 
continued fusion of European national armies has grown since 2007, but in the 
course of the global crisis, national solutions for other policy areas were tempo-
rarily more preferred. However, this push towards nationalization receded 
during the Eurocrisis. The different phases of the crisis are thus associated with 
different developments in the Europeanness of German elites, with the global 
financial and economic crisis paradoxically fostering national policy solutions 
and growing trust in federal, or rather supranational institutions, while the 
Eurocrisis unleashed a return to European policy solutions and the impression 
of amplified and problematic national asymmetries. 
Most of the aforementioned changes occurred during the 2005-2009 legisla-
tive period, and were either observable in all parties investigated or could be 
traced back to intra-party developments. Therefore, shifts in party stances were 
more responsible for patterns of change than the party system change of 2013 
with the Liberals exit from parliament. Investigating whether those shifts were 
the outcome of responsive MPs who anticipated shifting public opinion is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The results confirm our theoretical assumptions, albeit only partially. We 
assumed stability at least in terms of general support for European integration, 
given that economic considerations were prominent during both stages of the 
crisis and the German economy recovered quickly after the initial stage of the 
global financial and economic crises ended. Accordingly, Germany was able to 
bail out major national banks and contribute significantly to the rescue packag-
es for tottering Member States, while at the same time was not forced by exter-
nal pressure to implement harsh austerity policies in the way other Member 
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States investigated in this volume were. Although the assumption of stability is 
confirmed, general support did not increase in the course of the crises, which 
may indicate that the positive national economic developments are not ascribed 
to European integration, and general support is still rather driven by the (stable) 
emotional identification with Europe.  
We further expected growing support for intergovernmentalism, as the 
transfer of Germany’s austerity policy to the EU level implies an empowerment 
of German elites, achieved primarily by implementing elements of multilateral 
coordination and stratification based on the different economic weight of the 
Member States. Our empirical findings, however, show a modest turn towards 
federal conceptions, pursued preferably by means of parliamentarization of the 
EU. This seems to be caused by growing concerns among the German political 
elite with view to rising inequalities and asymmetries between Member States 
that may – in their view – enfold their centrifugal tendencies especially in 
intergovernmental structures. This may further explain German elites growing 
preference for a strengthened European Parliament and its close relation to the 
dimension of general support, as one functional principle of parliaments is to 
integrate societal conflicts by means of parliamentary representation (Best and 
Vogel 2014). However, it must be considered that elites in the German Bundes-
tag are less empowered by the aforementioned developments compared to the 
government itself. Thus, their federal turn may be further motivated by an 
attempt to counter executive empowerment. 
The retention of the overall permissive consensus vis-á-vis European inte-
gration was facilitated by the lack of a major political challenge from Euro-
sceptic parties – in contrast to most of the other countries investigated in this 
volume. However, since barely missing the entry into the national parliament in 
2013, the AfD has developed to the major Eurosceptic and right-wing populist 
party in Germany, challenging the pro-European consensus of the established 
parties. For this but also other reasons, the party has proven tremendously 
successful in all recent regional and European elections. Whether the permis-
sive consensus of Germany’s national elites will prevail under these circum-
stances, particularly should a Eurosceptic party enter the national parliament, 
remains an open question. Given the multidimensional structure of European-
ness, it is likely that the established national elites in Germany will initially 
respond to the Eurosceptic challenge by increasing their party competition in 
other dimensions than in terms of general support for European integration. 
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